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NOTES
Domestic Relations-Criminal Sanctions Against "ChildSnatching" in North Carolina
The American family, traditionally sanctioned as a bastion of
societal stability,1 is in the throes of fissure.2 The struggle between divorced spouses over the custody of their children has emerged as one of
the "most pernicious and tragic"' aspects of the familial rupture. The
battle for custody, characterized as transcending "the brutality and irregularity of guerilla warfare," 4 commonly crosses state lines,5 often
culminating in multiple interstate "child-snatchings." 6 The child,
1. The United States Supreme Court, frequently emphasizing the importance of
domestic cohesion, has awarded constitutional protection to the family unit. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (under the ninth
amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). See also
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
2. The divorce rate in the United States has consistently and drastically increased
in recent years, exceeding one million for the first time in 1975. In that year, an estimated 1,026,000 divorces were granted, double the number granted in 1966. By contrast the marriage rate declined in 1975 by 4.8%, representing the lowest rate since
1967. An estimated 2,126,000 marriages were performed in 1975 in the United States.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, 24 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS RE-

FORT No. 13, at 12-13 (1976).
The divorce rate in North Carolina is consistent with the national trend. In 1975,
22,107 divorces were granted, reflecting a 52% increase since 1970, and an almost 300%
increase since 1960. The state's marriage rate declined in 1975. N.C. DEP'T OF
HUMAN RESOURCES, 1 NORTH CAROLINA VrrAL STATISTICS 1975, at 1-6, 2-1 (1976).
3. Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts,39 Mo. L. Rv. 521, 521 (1974).
4. Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV.
379, 392 (1959).
5. Rapidly increasing divorce rates, see note 2 supra, coupled with unprecedented
individual and familial geographic mobility have made the interstate custody dispute,
once considered a rarity, commonplace. Article, Children in Transit: Child Custody
and Conflict of Laws, 6 U.C.D. L REv. 160, 161 (1973).
6. "Child-snatching" refers to the practice by which divorced or separated parents
obtain exclusive custody of their children, during or after custody disputes, by kidnapping them or by having them kidnapped. Within the context of this note the term
is used specifically with reference to transporting children to another state for this purpose. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the impetus to
child-snatch.
Although it is impossible to record the annual number of child-snatchings with complete accuracy, one account estimates it to be as high as 25,000 and reports of one professional agent who boasts of having effectuated 1,000 such snatchings. NEWSWEEK, Oct.

1276

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

many times no more than a pawn in the parental controversy," can be
permanently scarred by the lack of security and stability that results. 8
Presumably in an attempt to deter parental child-stealing and thereby
insure greater protection of the child's welfare, the North Carolina
Legislature in 1969 enacted General Statutes section 14-320.1, which
provides criminal sanctions for "snatching" children from this state.'
Section 14-320.1 specifically states that anyone who transports, or
causes to be transported, a child under the age of sixteen outside the
boundaries of North Carolina with the intent to violate a custody order
issued by this state shall be guilty of a felony. Such crime is punishable
by a fine, the amount of which rests with the discretion of the court,
by imprisonment for not more than three years, or both. The statute
also stipulates that keeping a child outside of North Carolina in violation
of a custody order for an excess of seventy-two hours is prima facie
evidence of an intent to violate that order.' 0 There is no official commentary construing the statute," nor is there any available judicial in18, 1976, at 24, 29. See also Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 1. Legal commentators uniformly agree that child-snatching has reached epidemic proportions. See, e.g.,
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JUIRISDICTION ACT, Prefatory Note; Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the
Conflict of Laws, 22 VAlx. L. REV. 1207, 1216-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A.].
7. Children may serve as a convenient weapon in the marital dispute. "It is common knowledge that in property negotiations that precede divorce, children are often
part of the bargain. They are frequently disposed of in exchange for advantageous property and support terms or out of personal motivation unrelated to their well-being." Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings and Problems of California
Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703, 721 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Multiplicity
of Custody Proceedings];see Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 85, 216 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1971)
(child used as "'tool'" in parental conflict); Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis,
10 LAw &CONTEMP. PROB. 700, 708 (1944).
8. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969). For analogous statutes see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-97, -98 (West
1972); Ky. REV. STAT. § 509.070 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.26 (West Cum. Supp.
1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.45, .50 (McKinney 1975).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969) reads:
Transporting child outside the State with intent to violate custody order.
-When any court of competent jurisdiction in this State shall have awarded
custody of a child under the age of sixteen years, it shall be a felony for any
person with the intent to violate the court order to take or transport, or cause
to be taken or transported, any such child from any point within this State to
any point outside the limits of this State or to keep any such child outside the
limits of this State. Such crime shall be punishable by a fine in the discretion
of the court or by imprisonrmtent in the State's prison for not more than three
years, in the discretion of the court, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Provided that keeping a child outside the limits of the State in violation of a
court order for a period in excess of seventy-two hours shall be prima facie
evidence that the person charged intended to violate the order at the time of
taking.
11. The sole official reference to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969) is found
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terpretation. 12 Despite the lack of a definitive statement of legislative
history and intent,'" the purposes of section 14-320.1 are readily discern-

ible from an analysis of the present status of custody litigation in the
United States.
As a general rule, both in North Carolina

4

and in most other

American jurisdictions, parents possess a primary natural and legal right
to their children' 5 and each parent is equally entitled to their custody.' 6

This right may be terminated upon judicial determination that the best
interests of the child require placement with one parent or, in some
instances, a third party. 7 Jurisdiction in such cases is presently exercised on three grounds:' 8 (1) domicile of the child within the state;'
(2) in personam jurisdiction over all of the custody claimants;20 or (3)
in a cursory opinion by former Attorney General Robert Morgan. 40 N.C. ATr'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 711 (1969).

12. A thorough search by the author of North Carolina appellate decisions failed
to produce any mention of this statute. Judicial interpretations of similar statutes, listed
in note 9 supra, are extremely scant.
13. A further, independent attempt by the author to procure official construction
of this statute proved unsuccessful. Former Senator Sankey W. Robinson, who introduced the statute as S. 48, 1969 N.C. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. could not be reached for
comment. An informal survey of counsel in the Attorney General's Office in Raleigh,
local lawyers and prominent legal scholars in North Carolina family law yielded no further information.
14. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975); Thomas
v. Pickard, 18 N.C. App. 1, 4, 195 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
16. Custody has been defined as the relationship that exists between parents and
children in a normal, ongoing family. It encompasses the right of the custodian to supervise, care for and educate the child.

H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

IN THE UNITED STATES 573 (1968). The right of a parent to the custody of his child
is incident to the parent's legal obligation, based on biological tie, to nurture and care
for the child. The parent's right is deemed superior to all others and, although not absolute, may be interfered with or denied only for substantial reasons. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (custody rights are "far more precious. . . than property
rights"); James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 104, 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1955); Thomas,
Child Abuse & Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293, 340 (1972).
17. See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) (first judicial mention of best interests standard); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) (first clear repudiation of primacy of parental rights over best interests of the child); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.2(a) (1976) (codification of the best interests standard). The welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration in custody determinations to which "even parental
love must yield." Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 411, 75 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1953).
It is "the polar star by which the discretion of the courts is to be guided." In re Lewis,
88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883).
18.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 79, Comment a (1971).

19. Domicile in this context is defined as the place with which one has the most
"settled connection" and considers to be home. H. CLARK, supra note 16, at 144. A
child's domicile is assumed to be that of the parent with whom he lives. Id. at 151.
Child-custodian relations were traditionally viewed as the exclusive task of the domiciliary state. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934).
20. See generally May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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physical presence of the child in the state.21 The majority of states, 22
including North Carolina,23 specifically provide that any one of these
concurbases is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. Consequently,
24
unusual.
not
is
states
more
or
two
in
rent jurisdiction
The extraterritorial effect of a state's custody decree is question25
The United States Supreme Court, although addressing the
able.
issue of interstate custody disputes on four occasions,

26

has failed to de-

termine conclusively whether a state must give full faith and credit to
a sister state's custody decree.2 7 In the landmark case of Halvey v. Hal21. Justification for this jurisdictional base derives from the doctrine of parens patriae. Once the child is present in a state, that state acquires a vital interest which "has
its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless" within its borders.
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
22. See, e.g., Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338, 132 A.2d 529 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Reed v. Reed,
11 Ohio Misc. 93, 229 N.E.2d 113 (C.P. 1967).
Some states seem to require that the child be domiciled within the borders of the
state before jurisdiction will be exercised in a custody dispute. See, e.g., Brown v.
Brown, 105 Ariz. 273, 463 P.2d 71 (1969); Stallings v. Bass, 204 Ga. 3, 48 S.E.2d 822
(1948); Tureson v. Tureson, 281 Minn. 107, 160 N.W.2d 552 (1968).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c)(2) (1976) provides that jurisdiction to enter
custody orders attaches "when the minor child resides, has his domicile or is physically
present" in North Carolina or when the court has personal jurisdiction of the claimants.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2 (1976) defines minor as "any person who has not reached
the age of eighteen years." See generally 3 R. LEE, NoRTH CAROLINA FAmiLY LAW §
222 (Supp. 1976).
24. Justice Traynor, who first proposed alternate jurisdictional bases in Sampsell
v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948), recognized the potential for
concurrent jurisdiction: "[I]f the child is living in one state but domiciled in another,
the courts of both states may have jurisdiction over the question of its custody." Id.
at 779, 197 P.2d at 750. He counseled confidence in other states' decisions and use
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to "avoid interminable and vexatious litigation"
which could, and in fact did, result. Id. at 778-80, 197 P.2d at 750. The concept of
concurrent jurisdiction has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Hudak, supra note 3, at
534 (characterized as the "Pandora's box of legally unbounded 'discretion' to judges").
See generally Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for
ExtralitigiousProceedings, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as The Interstate Child]; Ratner, Child Custody in a FederalSystem, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964).
25. Three theories support a state's refusal to recognize a sister state's decree: (1)
the issuing state's failure to acquire proper jurisdiction; (2) a change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant modification of the prior decree, see notes 30 & 32 infra; and (3)
the inapplicability of the full faith and credit doctrine, see note 27 infra.
26. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1, in conjunction with the enabling statute, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1738, 1739 (1970), provides that the records of judicial proceedings of one state shall
have the same force and effect in every state. See generally Corwin, The "Full Faith
and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933); Jackson, Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
A vigorous split of opinion exists on the bench, between states and among prominent legal scholars as to the proper application of the full faith and credit clause to
custody decrees. Justice Frankfurter, the most vocal advocate against use of the doctrine
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vey, 28 the Court did hold, however, that even if the doctrine of full faith

and credit is applicable to custody decrees, such an award would have

"no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final effect in the State

of the forum, than it has in the State where rendered.

'2

Thus, if the

in this area, argued that "the child's welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon
the State that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication
reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at another time." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The national policy of
using full faith and credit to curb litigious strife is viewed as subordinate to insuring
a proper custody determination. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613-14 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619-21 (1947) (Rutledge,
J.,concurring); Comment, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees, 73 YALE L.J. 134, 140-41 (1963) (against application; state experimentation in
areas of social policy is essential to the effective functioning of the federal system)
[hereinafter cited as Full Faith and Credit]. Proponents counter that child welfare, although an admirable goal, does not sufficiently warrant an exception to the full faith
and credit clause. Ratner, supra note 24, at 798. Justice Jackson, a forceful critic of
Frankfurter's interpretation, concluded that failure to apply the doctrine would "reduce
the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). One commentator has asserted that children "need the
benefits of full faith and credit more than ordinary litigants to assure the stability of
custody arrangements and the continuity of family attachments" so essential to their
well-being. Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note 6, at 1212. See note 37 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the importance of stability in the child's development. At least one commentator believes that if forced to decide the issue the Supreme
Court would embrace Justice Frankfurter's position. Currie, Full Faith and Credit,
Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 89, 115. But see Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 609-16 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (majority
failed to adopt Frankfurter's total rejection of full faith and credit as applied to custody
decrees); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 79, Comment c (1971).
At least three states have abandoned any pretense of recognizing sister state custody
decrees on grounds of either full faith and credit or comity. See Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 137-38, 62 A.2d 521, 527-28 (1948); Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan.
495, 233 P.2d 711 (1951); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 235 N.E.2d 109, 111,
288 N.Y.S.2d 44, 48 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Bachman v. Mejias,
1 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (1956).
North Carolina decisions clearly hold that a sister state's custody decree is entitled
to full faith and credit in the absence of a change in circumstances. See, e.g., Spence
v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 683, 198 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918
(1974); In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 201 (1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. REv.
842, 844-50 (1967); In re Osborne, 205 N.C. 716, 719, 172 S.E. 491, 492 (1934). See
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(b) (1976).
28. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
29. Id. at 614. In Halvey the Court held that a Florida custody award rendered
pursuant to an ex parte divorce decree was modifiable in New York since Florida retained the ability to so modify it. The Court reaffirmed Halvey in two subsequent cases,
relying on the holding to avoid reaching the constitutional question of the applicability
of full faith and credit to custody decrees. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962)
(South Carolina not bound by a Virginia order dismissing a habeas corpus custody petition since Virginia itself did not award res judicata effect to such orders); Kovacs v.
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (North Carolina could properly refuse to recognize a New
York modification of a North Carolina decree, and thereby modify New York's decree,
if there was a finding of changed circumstances). See also Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules
in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 243, 301 (1970) (discussion of Kovacs v. Brewer);
Full Faith and Credit, supranote 27.,
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custody order is modifiable in the issuing state, as it commonly is,8 0 it
is likewise modifiable in the forum state, provided that an adequate
jurisdictional base has been established. Since physical presence of the
child in the state is the simplest way to gain access to a more sympathetic forum,"' physical custody of the child becomes a primary goal
in the attempt to acquire a more favorable custody decree.
Given the great ease with which courts reopen custody questions
and modify decrees,32 the general judicial proclivity to favor local petitioners,3 and the ability of a child-snatcher to negotiate state boundaries with speed and mobility, easily establishing jurisdiction in favor-

able states, parental kidnapping is presently not merely permitted, but
is actually encouraged.

4

By agreeing to relitigate custody decisions,

30. Virtually every state provides that custody decrees may be modified upon a
showing of change in circumstances, the rationale being that developing children have
changing needs that must be satisfied by the parent best able to do so, an ability that
may change even over a relatively short period of time. See, e.g., Spence v. Durham,
283 N.C. 671, 683-84, 198 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974);
Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 75, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1965); N.C. GrN. STAT.
§ 50-13.7(a) (1976).
31. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. The most sympathetic state is usually the one in which the snatching parent resides or is domiciled.
32. The primary justification for modification is a finding of a change in circumstances, "easily made when a court is so inclined." Morill v. Morill, 83 Conn. 479, 492,
77 A. 1, 6 (1910). See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Wilsonoff
v. Wilsonoff, 514 P.2d 1264 (Alas. 1973); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d
60 (1950). See also A. EHRBNZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws § 87,
at 289-90 (1962); 3 R. LEE, supra note 23, § 228, at 46; Wurfel, Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 50 N.C.L. REv. 21, 64 (1971) (evidence of such change usually available);
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345, 352
(1953) (change in circumstances merely a manner of speech supporting a preconceived
result). North Carolina decisions, however, consistently require a substantial change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. See, e.g., Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C.
358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974); King v. Allen, 25 N.C. App. 90, 92, 212 S.E.2d
396, 397, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975); Harrington v. Harrington,
16 N.C. App. 628, 630, 192 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1972); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App.
401, 406, 170 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1969) (mere removal of the child out of the forum state
is insufficient change).
33. The problem of "hometown chauvinism" is a judicial reality. One commentator explains:
A judge may often be disinclined to change his own custody decree or that of
a colleague on the bench of his own state, but when the decree of another state
is involved, there are no external controls to counteract the sense of power and
competition that sometimes prevails. The second judge may believe that he
can do better for the child-or perhaps better for the local petitioner ....
Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note 6, at 1210-11. But see Foster, A Review of Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child, 12 WILLIAMETE L.J. 545, 552 n.28 (1976) (seriousness
with which judges take parens patriae responsibility, often agonizing more about reaching right results in contested custody cases than any other type of decision).
34. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 DiCK. L. REV. 305,
305 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legalized Kidnapping].
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courts in effect reward child-snatchers with the prospect of a more advantageous custody award. Yet, if the court refuses to reopen the

question, it risks perpetuating an order incongruent with the best interests of the child. Thus, in the midst of the "confused and chaotic"
judicial free-for-all of American custody litigation, 5 the rule of "seizeand-run"30 prevails, and the specter of child-snatching is raised.
Child-snatching not only defames the integrity of the judiciary and

the finality and efficacy of its decrees, but it is also severely detrimental
to the development of the snatched child.

Overwhelming sociological

and psychological data conclusively establish that stability in a child's
environment is imperative to successful emotional development and

character formation.

7

The severe shortcomings in interstate custody

law that permit unchecked litigation and relitigation deny innumerable

children the security and stability of permanent homes.3 8
snatching thus raises issues that merit official concern.

Child-

35. Hudak, supra note 3, at 533; see Hixson v. Hixson, 199 Or. 559, 263 P.2d 597
(1953) (husband filed between sixty and seventy separate documents in regard to custody); Allen v. Allen, 200 Or. 678, 268 P.2d 358 (1952) (two children of tender years
subject to seven separate custodial contentions between parents in nine years in courts
of Oklahoma, California and Oregon); Munroe v. Munroe, 47 Wash. 2d 391, 287 P.2d
482 (1955) (parents filed between twenty and thirty custodial contempt actions against
each other in three years); Bodenheimer, Multiplicity of Custody Proceedings, supra
note 7, at 719-20.
36. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
37. [O]ne of the critical aspects of a child's development is the need for stability in order to develop a sense of identity. When a child is kept suspended,
never quite knowing what will happen to him next, he must likewise suspend
the shaping of his personality.
S[Stability of the environment is far more crucial than its precise
nature and content. The one thing with which children have most difficulty
coping is unpredictable variation, and this is especially critical between the
ages of two and adolescence.
Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRAcusE L. Rav. 55, 64, 71 (1969). See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & J. SoLNrr,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (excellent psychological dissertation
on the importance of stability) (thoroughly discussed in Foster, supra note 33); Hudak,
supra note 3, at 523-24; Bodenheimer, U.C.C.I.A., supra note 6, at 1208-09; Note, In
the Child's Best Interests: Rights of Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings,
51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 446, 446 n.1 (1976) (list of authoritative psychological support). For
a specific example of a child traumatized by custodial change see Paschall v. Paschall,
26 N.C. App. 491, 216 S.E.2d 415 (1975).
38. The most recent analysis of marriage and divorce statistics estimates that
1,021,000 children under eighteen were involved in divorce litigation in 1972, and therefore vulnerable to custody relitigation. This figure represents a substantial increase from
the 330,000 children involved in 1952. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
3 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1972, MARRIAGE AND DIvORcE, at 2-9 (1976).
See also Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation:
Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 COLO. L. Rav. 495, 495 & n.3 (1975).
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Previous attempts, both judicial and legislative, to remedy the
problem of interstate child-snatching have proven sorely inadequate.
Judicial efforts, primarily through imposition of the "clean hands" doc-

trine 39 and application of the principle of forum non conveniens,40 have
failed to provide sufficient relief. The threat of pecuniary loss arising

from (1) civil liability in a suit instituted by the child himself for false
imprisonment and assault, 41 (2) civil liability in a suit by the custodial
parent for mental distress, 42 or (3) judicial reduction of the alimony
or child support due the snatching parent, 43 has not effectively deterred
child-snatching. Traditional legislative remedies, most commonly in
the form of statutory provisions for the imposition of civil contempt
charges 44 or injunctive decrees 45 against snatching parents, have likewise proved inadequate.
39. In theory, this doctrine requires that the violator of a sister state's decree be
denied access to the forum on the ground that he does not come with "clean hands."
See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 32, §§ 88-89. Use of the doctrine has been
hampered because of (1) the failure of courts to apply it when detrimental to the child,
see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 276, 413 P.2d 744, 749 (1966)
(to hold otherwise would inequitably punish innocent children for the wrongs of their
parents); Smith v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 274, 45 A.2d 879, 881 (Super. Ct. 1946); and
(2) the inapplicability of the doctrine when a child is legally in the forum state during
an authorized visit with the non-custodial parent. Washington and Wisconsin, however,
have offered exemplary leadership in effective application of the clean hands rule. See
Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); Zillmer v. Zillmer, 8 Wis.
2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 8 Wis. 2d 657, 101 N.W.
2d 703 (1960). North Carolina has shown an inclination toward recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees in cases of parental defiance. See, e.g., Sadler v. Sadler,
234 N.C. 492 65 S.E.2d 345 (1951); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861
(1951); Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949); Hopkins v. Hopkins,
8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970). But see In re Craigo, 266 N.C. 92, 145
S.E.2d 376 (1965); Dees v. McKenna, 261 N.C. 373, 134 S.E.2d 644 (1964).
40. Forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary refusal of a court to hear
a suit that, although properly brought before it, would in the interests of justice and the
convenience of the litigants be best tried elsewhere. For codification of this doctrine
see N.C. GN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c)(5), (6) (1976). Reluctance to apply this doctrine
is partially attributable to the judicial view that "[i]t is a grave matter to send to the
court of another state one who has properly brought his action here." 3 R. LEE, supra
note 23, § 229, at 50.
41. Institution of a suit by a child against his parents is presently possible in only
thirteen states that have abolished the doctrine of parental immunity. See Legalized
Kidnapping, supra note 34, at 309 n.32 for cases abrogating parental immunity. Even
if the action were generally maintainable, recovery would be uncommon due to the
numerous, predominately successful, available defenses. Id. at 310-11.
42. See, e.g., Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913). Infrequent use of this remedy may be partially
due to the common law rule that loss of services must be proved before a parent is entitled to any damages for the abduction of his child.
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 103 Cal. App. 2d 276, 229 P.2d 830 (1951)
(reduction in alimony); 3 R. LEF, supra note 23, § 222, at 16.
44. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.3(a) (1976).
45. See, e.g., id § 50-13.3(b).
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The potential use of general statutory kidnap4 6 prohibitions to
punish snatching parents has been hampered by the frequency with which
such sanctions are deemed inapplicable in the context of the parentchild relationship. Until recently, parents were specifically exempt
from the North Carolina kidnap law, 47 and prior to the enactment of
General Statutes section 14-320.1,48 the kidnap of a child by his parent
invoked no criminal penalties whatsoever in this state. Similar parental exemptions are found specifically in the federal law,49 and either
specifically5" or by implication"' in the laws of several states. Criticism
is justifiably levied against such exemptions. Parental kidnapping,
52
while arguably not as reprehensible as kidnapping by a third party,
is nevertheless detrimental to the welfare of the child and to society
as a whole. A parent, by an adverse court decree, is divested of his
"parental rights" and acquires the same status as a third party.53 A

logical, consistent interpretation of the kidnap law would seem to require that the non-custodial snatching parent be treated as a third party

through the imposition of some criminal sanctions. 4
In adopting section 14-320.1, the legislature rightly recognized the
severity of the interstate child-snatching issue, the inadequacy of pre46. Kidnapping has been defined as "the unlawful taking and carrying away of a
human being by force and against his will." State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 454, 180
S.E.2d 115, 118 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972). See generally PERKINS ON
CRimrNAL LAw 176-84 (2d ed. 1969).
47. Compare Law of May 15, 1933, ch. 542, § 1, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 890
(formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1969)), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1439 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
48. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
49. Congress specifically exempted parents from the operation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1975), in response to the fears of the House
Judiciary Committee that if there were no exemption parents who take their children
across state lines in defiance of custody decrees would be prosecuted. Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 34, at 306. The exception is, however, strictly construed. Miller
v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1941). Attempts to amend the federal statute
have proven unsuccessful, presumably due to the predominant view that the police and
the F.B.I. should not become entangled in domestic controversy. See generally Note,
The Problems of ParentalKidnapping, 10 Wyo. L.J. 225 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
ParentalKidnapping].
50. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.03(b)(2) (Vernon 1974).
51. See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. 138, 18 A. 756 (1889).
52. The parent is presumably not motivated by the greed and malice of the third
party taker, but rather by a "natural and sometimes irresistible urge to possess those who
are the natural objects of their affections." ParentalKidnapping, supra note 48, at 226.
But see note 7 supra.
53. Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 509, 127 P. 1023, 1024 (1912).
54. But see Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 34, at 308 (argument that as long
as parent retains the duty of support he is justified in claiming immunity even in the
face of an adverse decree for permanent custody).
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vious remedial efforts, and the imperative for innovative action. However, the efficacy of the statute in the prevention and elimination of
child-snatching is subject to criticism. The legislature may have
addressed the issue, but it has failed to solve the problem.
The threat of criminal conviction and the corresponding punishments invoked pursuant to section 14-320.1 have not proven effective
as a deterrent to child-snatching. Most parents, including potential
child-snatchers, are probably unaware of the existence of the law.
Furthermore, it is likely that even if adequately informed of the consequences of a child-snatching conviction, the intense emotion accompanying the typical snatching situation would preclude any appreciable
deterrent effect.
The utility of section 14-320.1 as a deterrent is further reduced
by the practical inability of North Carolina to enforce the law beyond
its borders. Although classification of child-snatching as a crime invokes usage of the extradition mechanism to prosecute violating parents
located outside the state, the difficulties inherent in the extradition
process itself render the law virtually useless. The United States Constitution requires that a person charged with a crime who flees from
justice and is found in another state be delivered up and removed to
the state having jurisdiction over him on demand of the executive
authority of that state.5 As a matter of federal law, the chief state
executive has a purely ministerial duty to extradite when the circumstances are within the contemplation of the Constitution." The governor, however, does have great discretion in the initial determination of
whether the accused has been adequately charged and is in fact a "fugitive from justice. '5 7 If the governor decides extradition is unwarranted and refuses to comply with the request, there are no means of
compulsion. His decision is final and not subject to judicial review.58
55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970) (enabling
legislation).
56. Biddinger v. Police Comm'r, 245 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1917); Drew v. Thaw, 235
U.S. 432, 439 (1914).
57. The phrase "fugitive from justice" implies that one commits a crime within a
state and then withdraws himself from its jurisdiction. Arguably, a parent who takes
a child outside of North Carolina in violation of a custody decree does not commit a
crime in North Carolina and then flee from the state. Rather, leaving the state with
the child is in fact the crime. Thus, the accused may be deemed as not having fled
from justice since the crime does not occur until the foreign jurisdiction is actually entered and extradition is therefore unwarranted.
58. The courts will not inquire into the motives that induce a governor to grant,
honor or refuse an extradition request. Such inquiry would be adverse to the executive's
right to act freely within his constitutional authority. See Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S.
192, 203-04 (1906); In re Sultan, 115 N.C. 57, 63, 20 S.E. 375, 378 (1894).
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It is unlikely that a state will agree to extradite a parent who has

violated a foreign decree when that state has judicially rejected the
validity of the prior decree and awarded custody according to its determination that the violating parent is the proper custodian. 59 Extradition, generally regarded as a serious procedure, may be successfully
avoided on any one of several available technical grounds when a state

is so inclined.

0

Thus, any deterrent effect that section 14-320.1 might

have seems far outweighed by the enormous increase in hostility and

further extra-legal conduct that use of the criminal law itself engenders.
Section 14-320.1 fails to address directly the question of where
and with whom the child should live. Pursuant to the statute, however,

a snatching parent may be imprisoned and thereby completely precluded from an assertion of custody. Such a result, however, may be
incongruent with the realistic demands of the situation. Since self-help

is presently the "ultimate authority"61 in custody litigation, a snatching

62
parent should not automatically be stigmatized as an unfit custodian.

Ironically, the current status of custodial determination drives persons
who are otherwise conscientious, law-abiding citizens to child-snatching

tactics, often against their inclinations. Indeed, lawyers who are reluctant to advise the use of snatching maneuvers frequently place their
clients at a decided disadvantage.6 3

The lack of extraterritorial respect for custody decrees and their
concomitant instability are not significantly affected by section
14-320.1. The act is inapplicable when a child is forcibly removed
from another state in violation of an existing decree and brought into
59. See In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1964) (California
refused to extradite an abducting mother to Texas on a kidnapping charge and granted
her custody of the child). The chief extradition officer in the Governor's Office in
Raleigh confirmed that in such situations extradition would be unlikely, offering in support examples of unreported incidences encountered through her office. Telephone interview with Ms. Sarah Jones, January 21, 1976.
60. Extradition may be refused if the chief state executive determines that (1) the
accused has not been adequately identified, see, e.g., Lee Gin Bor v. Ferrari, 55 F.2d 86
(1st Cir. 1932), (2) the accused is not a fugitive from justice, see, e.g., In re Hubbard,
201 N.C. 472, 475-76, 160 S.E. 569, 571 (1931); note 57 supra, (3) the warrant does
not sufficiently charge the accused with a crime, see, e.g., Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va.
557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944), or (4) the request was made with bad faith or for ulterior
purposes, see, e.g., In re Sultan, 115 N.C. 57, 20 S.E. 375 (1894).
61. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
62. For example, if Mother has a custody decree from state X and Father snatches
the child to state Y and obtains a favorable custody decree there, Mother's only recourse
may be to re-snatch the child back to state X.
63. UNEFORM CHILD CUSTODY JUTRIsDIcToN ACT, Prefatory Note.
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North Carolina where the issue of custody may be relitigated.0" While
the legislature seeks to punish child-snatchers, the court retains the
ability to reward them with favorable decrees. In addition, the statute
does not apply when a custody determination is pending prior to the
issuance of a final decree; nor does it affect the relitigation of custody
while a child is legally visiting the non-custodial parent in the foreign
forum.
Perhaps the ultimate evidence of the impotence of General Statutes section 14-320.1 is the fact that it simply is not used. There has
been no appellate court consideration of the statute", and there is an
appalling lack of knowledge as to its very existence. 66 In the mean67
time, incidences of child-snatching continue to increase.
Clearly, the imposition of criminal sanctions alone has failed to
prohibit child-snatchings. Crucial changes in the structure of interstate
custody litigation are no longer merely desirable, they are essential.
Various legal commentaries have advanced a plethora of prospective
solutions.68 Among them are suggestions that (1) modification of custody decrees be governed by the law of venue,69 (2) all out-of-state
visitation be restricted, ° (3) extrajudicial proceedings be employed in
72
the determination of custody, 71 (4) congressional action be invoked,
64. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) for exemplary treatment of this problem. The legislation provides that it is a felony to hold or hide a child
in California in violation of a custody order.
65. See note 12 supra.
66. See note 13 supra. Counsel in the child custody department of the Attorney
General's Office in Raleigh confirmed the fact that the statute is rarely invoked and little
is known about it. Telephone interview with Mr. Parks Eisenhower, January 24, 1976.
An informal survey by the author of local attorneys practicing in the area of child custody evidenced a similar lack of knowledge.
67. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
68. See Bodenheimer, Multiplicity of Custody Proceedings, supra note 7, at 72634 for general remedial recommendations.
69. Hudak, supra note 3, at 541-42, 547.
70. Id. at 535 (discussing York v. York, 246 Iowa 132, 141-42, 67 N.W.2d 28, 34
(1954) (refusal to allow out-of-state visitation on theory that presence of children in
foreign jurisdiction might force custodial parent to defend his rights that had been already fairly and conclusively determined)).
71. See The Interstate Child, supra note 24. A procedure similar to that used
in adoption and mental commitments has been proposed on the ground that an adversarial system can never effectuate the child's best interests. The plan encompasses a
concentration of responsibility for the child in a single "guardianship" court which would
maintain a complete dossier, appoint individual curators, and to which all subsequent
actions would be referred. Id. at 9-10.
72. Currie, supra note 27, at 115-17. Arguably Congress alone can provide adequate relief since it is the only body that can effectively collate and consider the widespread and varied experiences, the relevant sociological and psychological data and the
legal expertise imperative to satisfactory resolution.
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(5) a vigorous policy of self-restraint and cooperation be exercised by the
judiciary, 73 and (6) uniform legislation be nationally enacted.7 4 The
need for far-reaching and effective change is immediate. In view of
the slight likelihood that any action will be taken by Congress or the
Supreme Court in the near future, 75 and the time and difficulties inherent in complete rejection of the judicial process, uniform legislation
emerges as the most practical and realistic solution offered thus far.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act attempts to substitute
orderly, uniform processes of law for the presently chaotic state of affairs. 76 Primarily designed to "alleviate the plight of 'interstate children,' "7 the Act imposes jurisdictional standards for initial and subsequent custodial determinations. If uniformly observed, such standards
would terminate child-snatching by rendering it utterly useless to gain
physical custody of a child.
The Act requires that exclusive authority to decide or modify
custody be vested in only one court, to which all other courts must
defer. Mere physical presence of the child within the state is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Rather, the state that has the most substantial connection with the child will be the only state in which custody
may be properly litigated, both initially 8 and with regard to modification."' All parties who have been served or who submit to the jurisdiction of the court will be bound by the ensuing decree.8 0 Codification
73. See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
74. For example, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act discussed at notes
76-86 and accompanying text infra. See generally Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note
6.
75. The Supreme Court has traditionally avoided involvement in domestic relations, properly leaving family affairs for the most part within the realm of the states.
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 59394 (1890). See generally Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (exhaustive elucidation of the history of the federal abstention doctrine as applied to domestic relations).
76. UNIFORM CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT,Prefatory Note.
77. Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note 6, at 1207; see id. at 1219-21.
78. UNIFO M CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICrON ACT § 3.
79. Id. § 14.
80. Id. § 12. This section represents an attempt to avoid the requirement of personal jurisdiction in custody suits. But see May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)
(plurality ruling that in personam jurisdiction is imperative to the effective termination
of the "personal right" to custody). The decision has been widely criticized as encouraging parents who fear an unfavorable decree to refuse to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, thereby avoiding being bound by the decision and prolonging
further final custody determination. See Bodenhemier, U.C.C.I.A., supra note 6, at
1232; Currie, supra note 27, at 113 (contends decision is narrowly limited to facts of
the case); The Interstate Child, supra note 24, at 9 n.42 (contends decision is limited
to facts of the case); Hazard, supra note 4. The practical impact of May has been ap-
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of the "clean hands" doctrine s ' mandates a denial of jurisdiction to anyone who "wrongfully" transports a child out of state.82 The Act further
provides for simplified enforcement of existing decrees88 and requires

84
the replacement of judicial competition with judicial cooperation.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is exemplary.,
Coupled with criminal sanctions such as General Statutes section
14-320.1, the Act's refusal to reward the child-snatching parent with
a favorable decree provides an optimal solution and virtually ensures
the elimination of child-snatching in the United States.
Uniform adoption of the Act is imperative to its success.80 North
Carolina, through both its statutory custody provisions and an admirable
policy of judicial restraint, has reflected an orientation toward the
primacy of the child and the need for judicial cooperation in custody
disputes. This, however, is no longer adequate. The legislature is
therefore urged to consider adoption of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.
American courts have for far too long "suited the convenience and
desire of the non-custodial parent, while sacrificing the well-being of
[the child].187 Child-snatching poses an odious threat to the child's
preciably diminished due to liberal findings of change in circumstances and corresponding modifiability, and use of long-arm statutes to acquire personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970). See generally, Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 289, 307-17 (1973).
81. See note 39 supra.
82. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIC'noN Acr § 8. This section applies even
when no official custody decree has yet been rendered in any other state, thereby attempting to eliminate all forms of "reprehensible" conduct in custody affairs. Further,
custody decrees obtained in contravention of the principles of the Act, through presence
in the state for only a short period, will be refused any recognition. If the child would
be irreparably harmed by strict enforcement of this section, the abductor may be favored
with a decree, but will be punitively charged with all expenses.
83. Id. §§ 13-15.
84. Id. §§ 16-24.
85. But see Hudak, supra note 3, at 547, 549 (criticizes Act as "impractical and
naive" and as having the capacity to perpetrate the evils it seeks to alleviate); Comment,
Family Law: Court's Adoption of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act Offers Little
Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV. 820 (1976).
86. Presently, only nine states have enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Curh. Supp. 1977); CoLo. REv. STAT.
§§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1973); HAwAII REV. STAT. H9 583-1 to -26 (Supp. 1975); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.651 to
.673 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.700 to .930 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. H§ 822.01 to .25 (1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-143 to -167 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Minnesota has judicially adopted the Act, inconsistent case law notwithstanding. See In re Giblin, - Minn. -, 232 N.W.2d 214
(1975). Adoption of the Act is not reciprocal in effect. Although only nine states
have enacted it, the ramifications should be more far-reaching.
87. Hudak, supra note 3, at 548.
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best interests and insults the equity of our legal structure. The
integrity of the judiciary and the welfare of the child mandate its

elimination.
ANDREA ANN TIM O

Zoning-Restrictions on Mobile Homes:

The Beginning of the

End?
Fifty years after zoning ordinances first underwent judicial exami-

nation' the New Jersey Supreme Court, one of the nation's leading state
forums for zoning adjudication,' in Taxpayers Association v. Weymouth

Township3 upheld the validity of a municipal ordinance that limited the
use of mobile home units within trailer parks to elderly persons. The
Weymouth decision comes just one year after the New Jersey court's
landmark decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township

of Mount Laurel4 striking down exclusionary zoning regulations. Considered in light of Mount Laurel, the Weymouth result may appear to
limit the extent to which the court is willing to find an impermissible

exclusionary intent or effect in local land use regulations--even when
those regulations expressly restrict residential land use on the basis of
types of occupancy. 5 The decision could thus be misread as being

another in a series of recent decisions6 that in effect give judicial ap1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see note 22
infra.
2. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING § 6.04, at 119-21 (1972).
3. 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). A companion case to Weymouth also
upheld zoning ordinances permitting special residential uses for the elderly. Shepard v.
Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
4. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
5. See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.
Ct. 555 (1977), noted in 55 N.C.L. Rnv. 733 (1977) (upholding municipality's refusal
to rezone a 15 acre parcel from single family to multi-family classification, thus preventing construction of a housing complex for low and moderate income tenants); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance restricting the use of one-family residences to persons related by blood, adoption or marriage,
or to not more than two unrelated persons); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971),
noted in 50 N.C.L. REv. 369 (1972) (upholding a California constitutional provision
requiring approval by local referendum before low-rent housing projects may be established in a community); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), noted il 54 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1976)
(upholding a comprehensive zoning plan designed to control the municipality's growth,

1290

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

proval to exclusionary zoning ordinances. The Weymouth opinion,
however, strongly reaffirms the New Jersey court's view that local zoning ordinances must promote the general welfare of an entire region
rather than merely the welfare of the municipality promulgating the
regulations. Ultimately, Weymouth is significant in detailing the
criteria with which the exclusionary impetus or impact of such ordinances might be discerned, criteria that may lead to the invalidation in
New Jersey and elsewhere of zoning restrictions that restrict or prohibit
the residential use of mobile homes.
Weymouth Township's general zoning ordinances, which had
previously permitted trailer camps in one .district of the municipality,8
were amended in 1971 to prohibit generally the use of trailer homes
within the township.

The amended ordinances did, however, permit

the establishment of a limited number of trailer parks upon compliance
with specified requirements, 9 the most significant of which restricted
occupancy to "elderly persons" or "elderly families,"'10 defined as individuals or heads of households fifty-two years of age or older." The

Taxpayers Association of Weymouth Township and several of its
members filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the ordinances were enacted

improperly, constituted illegal "spot zoning" and unconstitutionally infringed upon the rights of children. 1 2 The Superior Court, Law Divi-

sion, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.' 3 On appeal, the Superior
Court, Appellate Division, reversed and invalidated the ordinances,
ruling that the municipality's zoning power did not authorize ordinances
restricting land use by the age of occupants' 4 and that the ordinances
in effect limiting the number of newcomers who may reside in the community); cf. Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (rejecting a challenge against allegedly exclusionary zoning ordinances for petitioners' lack of standing).
7. Weymouth, N.J., Ordinances 171-1971 (July 7, 1971) & 172-1971 (June 25,
1971); see 71 N.J. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021. The township had adopted its zoning
policy in 1966. Id. at 258, 364 A.2d at 1021.
8. 71 N.J. at 258, 364 A.2d at 1021.
9. Id. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021.
10. As quoted by the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, the crucial
portion of the ordinance provides: "Trailer parks are generally prohibited in the Township. A special exception to fulfill the needs of senior citizens, as defined by this ordinance, has been made by the township. Occupancy by any persons other than elderly
[persons] or elderly families is hereby prohibited." Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth
Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 379, 311 A.2d 187, 188 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973)
(quoting Weymouth, N.J., Ordinance 172-1971 (June 25, 1971)).
11. Id. "Elderly families" is further defined as those in which the youngest spouse
is 45 years of age or older, and in which all children are at least 18 years of age. Id.
12. 71 N.J. at 260, 364 A.2d at 1022.
13. Id.
14. 125 N.J. Super. at 380-81, 311 A.2d at 189.
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were unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 15 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinances did not exceed
the municipality's zoning power, 16 did not violate either the due process
1
or equal protection provisions of the state or federal constitutions,'
and did not, on the basis of the facts before it, constitute impermissible
exclusionary zoning.' 8
Although zoning ordinances designed to provide housing for the

elderly have been promulgated by many communities, court tests of
their validity have not provided uniform results.'

9

The Weymouth de-

cision is significant not only in increasing the number of those courts
that have upheld such ordinances, but also in doing so after reviewing

the facts of the case in an unusually thorough manner. This close scrutiny is in part required by the New Jersey constitution's equal protection
provisions," and in part by the requirements of the Mount Laurel deci-

sion-itself based on state constitutional grounds.'

In contrast, the

standard of review applied to zoning ordinances by most forums con-

tinues to be the test formulated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
15. Id. at 382, 311 A.2d at 189-90; see note 52 and accompanying text infra.
16. 71 N.J. at 275, 364 A.2d at 1030.
17. Id. at 287-88, 364 A.2d at 1037; see notes 52 & 71 and accompanying text
infra.
18. See id. at 295-96, 364 A.2d at 1041. The court upheld the lower court's dismissal of the unlawful conspiracy and illegal spot zoning challenges originally raised
against the ordinances. Id. at 261, 364 A.2d at 1022.
19. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.44 (2d ed. 1976). Compare Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P.
1965), with Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.R2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
20. The equal protection provisions of the New Jersey Constitution provide in
part: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those . . . of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property. .. ." N.J. CONsr. art. 1, § 1; "No person shall be denied the enjoyment of
any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or
military right . . . because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin." Id. § 5. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that, because of these
provisions, "[W]here an important personal right is affected by governmental action, this court often requires the public authority to demonstrate a greater 'public need'
than is traditionally required in construing the federal constitution." Taxpayer's Ass'n
v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 286, 364 A.2d at 1036. For an example of this
demanding review, see Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 331 A.2d 262
(1975), upholding the validity of an ordinance prohibiting canvassing or soliciting without first registering with the chief of police and procuring a permit. In rejecting appellants' equal protection challenge to the ordinance the court observed that "application
of a test based either on mere rationality or strict scrutiny is not called for; rather we
adopt a 'means-focused' standard. This narrows our inquiry to the 'crucial question
[of] whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.'" Id. at 370, 331 A.2d at 274.
21. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725.
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Co.-a test that accords land use regulations a substantial presumption

of validity when challenged on either federal or state constitutional
grounds.22 New Jersey applied this deferential standard in many of
its earlier zoning cases; 23 it was utilized in particular by the New Jersey
Supreme Court to uphold the validity of local zoning ordinances that
in effect banned house trailers from the municipality. The court's approval of such bans, first set forth in Vickers v. Township Committee,"4
was predicated upon a "broad interpretation" of the general welfare.2"
If any zoning oidinance was "reasonably calculated" to promote the
general welfare, 26 as it was thus expansively defined, the ordinance
was, according to the Vickers court, a proper exercise of the muniThe Vickers court
cipality's zoning power as derived from the state.
22. The United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), established that in any judicial test of a zoning ordinance "it must
be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395. This complaisant standard continues
to be applied without variation in federal courts, as was observed by the Supreme Court
in Arlington Heights when it referred approvingly to "the generous Euclid test, recently
reaffirmed in Belle Terre." 97 S.Ct. at 562. With respect to state law the Euclid Court
had declared: "The question is the same under both [the United States and Ohio] Constitutions. . . : Is the ordinance invalid in that it violates the constitutional protection 'to
the right of property in the appellee by attempted regulations under the guise of the
police power, which are unreasonable and confiscatory?'" 272 U.S. at 386. As a result
the Euclid test, though formulated by a federal court, is applied by most states in zoning
cases, whether a challenge is based on state or federal constitutional grounds. See 1
R. ANDERSON, supra note 19, § 3.14, at 106-07. As noted earlier, however, the equal
protection provisions of the New Jersey Constitution have, with respect to zoning and
other cases, required a standard of review somewhat more rigorous than that established
in Euclid. See note 20 supra.
23. See 1 N. WILAMS, supra note 2, § 6.04, at 119.
24. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
233 (1963).
25. Id. at 247, 181 A.2d at 137. Under this interpretation the "general welfare"
is defined in such generalized terms as the "public convenience" or "general prosperity."
Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 28, 118 A.2d 401, 407 (1955) (quoting Schmidt v.
Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 415, 88 A.2d 607, 611 (1952)). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has related this generalized and all-embracive reading of the general welfare to the equally broad and inclusive concept of the public welfare set forth in the
landmark opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33 (1954). Under this relatively vague definition court examination of zoning ordinances is cursory since this amorphous conception of the general welfare provides a
rationale for almost any zoning provision. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 infra.
26. 37 N.J. at 247, 181 A.2d at 137.
27. At the time suit was commenced the New Jersey zoning statutes provided in
part:
Any municipality may by ordinance, limit and restrict to specified districts
and may regulate therein, buildings and structures according to their construction, and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the
uses of land, and the exercise of such authority, subject to the provisions of
this article, shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State.
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declared that the regulation of trailer camps was bound up with "the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare" of any municipality; 2

accordingly, court sanction of any regulation of trailer homes-including
their outright prohibition-would follow almost as a matter of course.

The broad power thus accorded to local zoning authorities was attacked
in a heralded 29 dissent to Vickers, in which it was recognized that the
expansive view of the general welfare taken by the majority could em-

brace any conceivable zoning purpose30 and thus make it virtually impossible for31any allegedly exclusionary ordinances to be attacked
successfully.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, thereafter delivered its

landmark opinion in Mount Laurel, signaling its determination to strike
down local ordinances that clearly resulted in exclusionary zoning. The
Mount Laurel court set- forth an elaborate and demanding definition

of the general welfare, specifically including an affirmative obligation
to provide the opportunity for "an appropriate variety and choice of

housing, for all categories of people." 2 Zoning regulations that in
any way restricted the availability of housing to favored groups would,
under this test, fail to promote the general welfare and thus be
an improper exercise of the zoning power. In addition, the Mount
Laurel decision defined the general welfare in terms of regions of the

state, rather than merely of the locality establishing the regulation. 3
Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed for one or more of the following purposes: to .... promote health,
morals, or the general welfare ....
Law of April 3, 1928, ch. 274, §§ 3, 5, 1928 N.J. Sess. Laws 696-97, as amended by
Law of Aug. 9, 1948, ch. 305, § 1, 1948 N.J. Sess. Laws 1221 (amending § 3; formerly codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 (West 1967)) & Law of July 31, 1964,
ch. 150, § 1, 1964 N.J. Sess. Laws 682 (amending § 5; formerly codified at N.J. STAT.
The state zoning statutes subsequently underwent
ANN. § 40:55-32 (West 1967)).
major revision. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:55D-1 to -92 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
For the effect of this revision upon Weymouth, see note 81 and accompanying text infra.
28. 37 N.J. at 246, 181 A.2d at 136-37.
29. See, e.g., Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of
Northeastern New Jersey, in LAND UsE CONTROLS: PRESENT A FuTuRE REFORm 105,
125 (D. Listokin ed. 1974), in which Justice Hall's dissent is referred to as "by far the
best of modem zoning opinions."
30. 37 N.J. at 261, 181 A.2d at 145 (Hall, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 258-59, 181 A.2d at 143.
32. 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731. The basic test of the constitutionality of zoning ordinances remains the same-if the ordinances are shown to promote the general
welfare, they constitute proper exercises of the zoning power and are therefore valid.
However, by defining with unusual specificity the meaning and requirements inherent
in the concept of the general welfare, the Mount Laurel court in effect required that
zoning ordinances meet a more rigorous standard in order to be considered as promoting
the general welfare.
33. Id. at 188-90, 336 A.2d at 732-33.
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By setting forth a comprehensively detailed definition of the general
welfare that was to be promoted by zoning ordinances, the Mount
Laurel court thus effectively restricted the scope of municipal land use
regulation-prohibiting zoning ordinances that restricted access to
the use of land on the basis of economic or racial factors.
This demanding standard of review necessitated the Weymouth
court's detailed demonstration of how the Weymouth ordinances promoted the general welfare of both the municipality and the region, and
thus lay within the purview of the zoning power. Ironically, the Weymouth court found that the very specific definition of the general
welfare provided a rationale for zoning ordinances permitting the
limited use of house trailers. In contrast, the Vickers court had held that
its view of the general welfare justified a total ban on the use of such
trailers in another municipality. In changing its views as to how the
use of trailer homes might alternatively impede or promote the general
welfare, the New Jersey court's decisions on the zoning of trailers may
seem inconsistent.3 4 But by adopting the view expressed in Mount
Laurel that "provision for adequate housing of all categories of people
is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare
required in all land use regulation,"' 5 the Weymouth court appears
to indicate that ordinances that expand housing opportunities, rather
than limit them, will hereafter find court approval.30
The court supported its conclusion that the Weymouth ordinances
promoted the general welfare by reviewing in considerable detail the
array of state and federal proclamations and programs illustrating governmental determination to provide for the housing needs of the elderly
and thereby to promote their welfare and that of the political entity as
34. See 71 N.J. at 265, 364 A.2d at 1025, where the court declares: "In this regard, the term [general welfare] is mutable and reflects current social conditions."
35. 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727.
36. See 71 N.J. at 274-75, 364 A.2d at 1030. In this respect the Weymouth court
aligns itself with the ruling in Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369
N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975), which upheld a zoning ordinance
creating a residential district providing, inter alia, for a Retirement Community District.
The Maldini court, finding the ordinance properly within the New York zoning statutes,
observed:
[The ordinance's] purpose-meeting the town's need for adequate housing for
the aged-was within the town's police powers to regulate land use for the promotion of the community's health and general welfare ....

cial.Certainly, when a community is impelled . . . to move to correct social and historical patterns of housing deprivation, it is acting well within its
delegated 'general welfare' power.
Id. at 484-86, 330 N.E.2d at 405-06, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90.
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a whole. 7 The court cited these materials and various sociological
authorities to create a persuasive record justifying the use of trailer
homes as specifically permitted residences for the elderly, and, by
necessary implication, for all other income or age groups as well. 8
The court declared that ordinances of such benefit to the general welfare would justify either a variance of, or reasonable exception to, the
municipality's general ban on trailer homes. 9 It then noted approvingly that the ordinance would help satisfy the region's housing require37. 71 N.J. at 266-75, 364 A.2d at 1025-30. See such representative provisions
as: 12 U.S.C. § 1701h-1 (1970) (regarding the establishment of an "advisory committee on matters relating to housing for elderly persons"); id. § 1701r (in which Congress declared: "Our older citizens face special problems in meeting their housing needs
because of the prevalence of modest and limited incomes among the elderly . . . and
their need for housing planned and designed to include features necessary to the safety
and convenience of the occupants in a suitable neighborhood environment."); id. §
1701z-6 (Supp. V 1975) (authorizing the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
to determine what housing is "most effective or appropriate to meet the needs of groups
with special housing needs including the elderly"); 42 id. § 1401 (1970) (declaring the
national policy "to make adequate provision . . . for families consisting of elderly persons"); id. § 3012(a) (4) (Supp. V 1975) (establishing the function of the Administration
on Aging to "develop plans . . . and carry out programs designed to meet the needs of
older persons for social services, including . . . low-cost transportation and housing");
id. § 3028(a)(1) (providing for model projects to "assist in meeting the special
housing needs of older persons"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-21 (West Cum. Supp. 197778) (encouraging "senior citizen community housing construction consistent with provisions permitting other residential uses of a similar density in the same zoning district");
id. § 52:27D-28.1 (stating that "senior citizens . . . need and deserve the attention, assistance, and protection of the State"). In particular see id. § 55:14L-2, which establishes the creation of housing for the elderly as part of the state's policy to promote
the welfare of the state:
It is hereby found and declared . . . that the lack of properly constructed
rental housing units designed specifically to meet the needs of the elderly of
this state in the lower middle-income bracket at rentals which this class of elderly can afford constitutes a menace to the health, safety, welfare and morals
of the public ....
Id. This statute provides substantial support for the Weymouth holding that local zoning regulations designed to encourage the provision of such housing satisfy the general
welfare requirement of the New Jersey zoning statutes.
38. See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
39. 71 N.J. at 278-80, 364 A.2d at 1032-33; see DeSimone v. Greater Englewood
Hous. Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 440, 267 A.2d 31, 37 (1970), in which the court upheld a variance to a local zoning ordinance permitting a housing project for lower income groups, declaring:
"Special reasons" is a flexible concept; broadly speaking, it may be defined by
the purposes of zoning set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55-32, which specifically include promotion of "health, morals or the general welfare." . . . So variances
have been approved for many public and serfi-public uses because they significantly further the general welfare.
For a decision providing even broader general welfare grounds justifying a variance for
a housing project for the elderly, see Borough of Roselle Park v. Township of Union,
113 N.J. Super. 87, 272 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970). See also E. BARTLEY
& F. BAIR, MOBILE HOME PARKS AND COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING 91
(1960), on the value of special exceptions in connection with the use of mobile homes,
although none of the special exceptions discussed therein are based on occupant age.
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ments for the elderly and thus would comport with the Mount Laurel
test.40 In this important aspect the Weymouth opinion differs sharply
from the holding reached in the analogous case of Hinman v. Planning
& Zoning Commission.41 In that case a zoning provision establishing
a housing development for the elderly was struck down by a Connecticut court which insisted that the challenged ordinance was invalid in
not promoting the local general welfare."
Other issues may have
guided the Hinman court to apply that line of reasoning; 43 certainly the
approach of the Weymouth decision,"' focusing upon the relationship

of a challenged ordinance to the regional general welfare, is more appropriate in zoning adjudication.45
Although zoning ordinances will inevitably affect people as well
as property, they are nonetheless designed as regulations upon the use

of land, not upon those who use it. The Weymouth ordinances, by restricting the use of mobile homes on the basis of their occupants rather
than on the characteristics of the homes themselves, seem to disregard
that distinction. Opposition to ordinances such as the Weymouth provisions has usually been based on this distinction," and one jurist has even
40. 71 N.J. at 275 n.9, 364 A.2d at 1030 n.9.
41. 26Conn. Supp. 125, 214A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965).
42. It is hard to conceive how there could be a need, in a town which is
chiefly rural, having a population of less than 5000 people, for a community
for aged people. . . . The welfare of aged people undoubtedly is a matter of
concern to the state and federal government, but it is not ordinarily a matter
of local governmental concern, and certainly not in towns the size of Southbury.
Id. at 129, 214 A.2d at 133-34.
43. "[1It is obvious that the matter of enforcement of such a zoning regulation
would create problems of considerable magnitude. . . . [ihe proposed zoning amendment appears to be designed to promote the financial interests of the petitioners for its
adoption rather than the public welfare . . . ." Id. at 130, 214 A.2d at 134; see 2 N.
WMLIAMS, supra note 2, § 50.16, for a general discussion of Hinman and the Connecticut court's reasons for rejecting the proposed housing project and for thus relying on
such "a parochial view of the nature of the general welfare requirement underlying zoning ...... Id. § 50.16, at 303.
44. Accord, Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385,
appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975). The New York court observed, in regard to
the ordinance's purpose in meeting housing needs of the aged, that "[niot only was this
an important goal of the Town's Comprehensive Plan, but a matter of general public
concern not only to the locality but to the State and Nation as well." Id. at 485, 330
N.E.2d at 405-06, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (footnotes omitted).
45. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 20, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), in which the court declared:
"In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipality must
not ignore housing needs, that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing
needs of its own population and of the region." (emphasis added).
46. See Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 128-29, 214
A.2d 131, 133 (C.P. 1965); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 261-62, 181 A.2d
129, 145 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233
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raised this doctrine to constitutional dimensions. 47 Recent commentators have noted, however, that the distinction is illusory, for it ignores
the extent to which zoning ordinances, ostensibly regulating solely the
physical use of land, necessarily impinge upon the social and economic

well-being of those who are affected, however indirectly, by the use
of that land. 48 As the Weymouth court correctly observed, "[A]s a conceptual matter regulation of land use cannot be precisely dissociated
from regulation of land users."'4 9 In fact, if zoning ordinances are ever

to improve the general welfare to any substantial degree, such social
and economic factors must provide the express rationale for the
ordinances. 50 The New Jersey courts have recognized that zoning or-

dinances drafted to implement certain social planning goals may properly regulate land use. 5'

Therefore the Weymouth ordinances, de-

signed to provide adequate and appropriate housing for certain age
groups of the community, are not invalid because they operate in terms
(1963); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 135 N.J. Super. 97,
99, 342 A.2d 853, 855 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005
(1976); Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 380-81, 311 A.2d
187, 189 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976); Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 489, 330 N.E.2d 403, 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 393 (1975)
(Jasen, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); Campbell v. Barraud, 88
Misc. 2d 97, 100-03, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383-86 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
47. Arguing that the ordinances challenged in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1973), violated the equal protection clause, Justice Marshall declared:
Zoning officials properly concern themselves with the uses of land-with, for
example, the number and kind of dwellings to be constructed in a certain
neighborhood or the number of persons who can reside in those dwellings. But
zoning authorities cannot validly consider who those persons are, what they believe, or how they choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic
or Jew, Republican or Democrat, married or unmarried.
Id. at 14-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
48. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supranote 2, § 13.05, at 289, where the author declares:
Many issues which come up as land use decisions have substantial social and
economic implications: the obvious (but not the only) example is a decision
as between different types of housing. By now this is widely realized, and so
responsible public officials are likely to take such implications into account
It has long been settled in both law and widespread practice that towns
may take such considerations into account, at least to some extent.
49. 71 N.J. at 277, 364 A.2d at 1031.
50. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, § 1.11, at 22, quoted in Shepard v. Woodland
Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230,'248, 364 A.2d 1005, 1015-16 (1976).
See also 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, § 13.05, at 290:
[lit is more than a little surprising-and more than a little naive-for courts
in the 1970's to attempt to lay down a rule that land use controls may be used
only to regulate the physical pattern and physical interrelationships, and not
for any type of social or economic concerns.
51. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 24748, 364 A.2d at 1015-16. ("Permission to develop age homogeneous communities as a
possible use in a multifaceted community is a legislative judgment which should not be
disturbed by this Court unless clearly violative of constitutional principles.")
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of occupants' ages, rather than directly in terms of the tracts being
regulated.
Though classifications by occupant age may be properly within the
general regulatory ambit of zoning, the particular classifications challenged in Weymouth nonetheless appear to raise problems under the
equal protection provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.52
In general, judicial review of state regulations challenged on equal protection grounds is deferential53 and requires only a rational relationship
between the classifications under attack and a legitimate state objective
when the regulations neither impinge upon "fundamental interests" or
classify according to "suspect criteria."54 Although housing may be one
of "the most basic human needs,"5 it is nonetheless not deemed a "fundamental right" invoking strict scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment.'6 Accordingly, the New Jersey court recognized that the Weymouth ordinances are not subject to exhaustive equal protection review
52. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall. . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNs'r. amend.
XIV, § 1. See note 20 supra for the text of the equal protection provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution.
53. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in which the Court
stated:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion
in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
54. For a general discussion of current Supreme Court application of equal protection review see Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). In addition, see Justice Marshall's attack on the current two-tier equal protection approach of
the Court in his dissent in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (per curiam). In that case Marshall espoused a formally declared policy of
equal protection review that focuses "upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of
the classification." Id. at 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 178, 336 A.2d 713, 727 (1975); accord, Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township,
71 NJ. 249, 266, 364 A.2d 1016, 1025 (1976).
56. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In Lindsey the Court rejected
the contention that the "need for decent shelter" was a fundamental interest requiring
strict scrutiny of any challenged regulation affecting that interest, declaring "[a]bsent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing . . . is a legislative, not judicial, function. . . ." Id. at 74. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Court observed that "the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for
purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 30.
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simply because they bear directly upon the housing needs of the par-

ties affected.57
In addition, the court noted that the challenged zoning ordinances
did not require strict scrutiny because they established classifications
based upon the age of prospective mobile home dwellers. The court
relied on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Massa-

chusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,5 holding that age was not a
suspect criterion under the fourteenth amendment. 59

It further ob-

served that even under the more demanding review required by state
standards the Weymouth ordinances need not be subjected to strict

scrutiny.60 As the Weymouth court noted, the ordinance does not burden the elderly as the regulation challenged in Murgia allegedly did;6 1
rather the ordinance seeks to implement programs for their benefit,

much like numerous other governmental initiatives.

2

Governmental

provisions of a positive, affirmative nature-designed to open up hous-

ing opportunities to the elderly, rather than to deny them to individuals
not fulfilling the age specifications-are invariably spared rigorous

court review. 63 Therefore the decision of the Weymouth court not to
apply strict scrutiny to the zoning ordinances, and thus subject them to
likely invalidation, seems correct.

Even if age is a suspect criterion

when used as the basis of governmental classifications, the resulting
discrimination in this case, as in others, favors, rather than handicaps,
the elderly.64
57. See 71 NJ. at 281, 364 A.2d at 1034.
58. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
59. 71 N.J. at 281-82, 364 A.2d at 1034 (citing 427 U.S. at 313-14).
60. Id. at 286-87, 364 A.2d at 1036-37; see note 20 supra.
61. 427 U.S. at 323-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See statutes cited in note 37 supra. See also Parrino v. Lindsay, 29 N.Y.2d
30, 35, 272 N.E.2d 67, 69-70, 323 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (1971):
As bearing on the reasonableness of a classification based on age or income,
we but note the many laws which provide for public assistance, social security
payments, reduction in real estate taxes for elderly home owners and double
exemption on the computation of Federal, State and city income taxes and
other protective legislation based wholly on the age or economic need of the
recipient.
63. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973).
64. Even though dissenting in Murgia, Justice Marshall conceded that the elderly
do not suffer from discrimination to the same extent as such traditionally suspect classes
as Blacks, or such "quasi-suspect" classes as women or illegitimates. Indeed, 'The
elderly are protected not only by certain anti-discrimination legislation, but by legislation that provides them with positive benefits not enjoyed by the public at large. Moreover, the elderly are not isolated in society, and discrimination against them is not pervasive but is centered primarily in employment." 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting). With respect to the field of housing it is significant to note that government
regulations banning discrimination in housing omit age as an improper basis for discrimination, as if implicitly recognizing that the elderly are rarely, if ever, disfavored in the
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It could be argued that the age-oriented Weymouth ordinances do
infringe upon younger citizens' rights to use mobile homes within the
municipality. Since, however, Weymouth Township could have lawfully denied such housing to any individual, regardless of age or
income,"5 a provision that operates to remove that prohibition even
partially does not further aggravate the mobile home housing needs of
those still subject to the township's general ban on mobile homes. Indeed, allowing the elderly to occupy mobile homes may make more
traditional (if more costly) housing stock available to those who cannot
take advantage of the Weymouth ordinances.6
If the age of prospective occupants is permitted as a basis for the
Weymouth ordinances' classifications, then it follows that the adoption
of a particular age, fifty-two, as the cut-off for the regulations' operation
is valid unless proven to be arbitrary. Legislative line-drawing on the
basis of age is accorded a high degree of deference by the courts, 7
even when important needs such as food and shelter are at issue. 8
Under that generous standard of review it is evident that the fifty-two
year age limit set by the Weymouth ordinances should not be considered arbitrary. In fact, the permissive use of trailers for those over
age fifty-two actually relaxes the rigidity of the trailer prohibition more
than would the benchmarks established to define the "elderly" in other
housing market. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5309(a) (Supp. V 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
10:5-9.1, -12.f to .k (1976).
65. See Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). See also text accompanying notes 2428 supra.
66. The same could be said of many of the government provisions cited in note
37 supra. Special efforts to house the elderly promote the accommodation of tile housing needs of all individuals, and to the extent the demand of the elderly is satisfied by
such government projects the overall demand for adequate housing is reduced, making
it easier for other groups to obtain housing on their own.
67. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In a separate opinion Justice
Stewart recognized that applying strict scrutiny to age limitations renders any given demarcation subject to invalidation. Referring to an Oregon provision setting the minimum voting age at 21 years, Stewart declared: "Yet to test the power to establish an age qualification by the 'compelling interest' standard is really to deny a State
any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a 'compelling interest' in drawing
the line with respect to age at one point rather than another." Id. at 294-95. (Stewart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As was observed by another court, discussing Justice Stewart's opinion, "The power to establish an age requirement necessarily
involves the power to choose a reasonable one ...

"

Wurtzel v. Falcey, 69 N.J. 401,

404-05, 354 A.2d 617, 619 (1976) (per curiam).
68. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (while there is a "dramatically real factual difference" between cases involving business and industry and
those involving the "most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," that is
no basis for applying a different constitutional standard). See also notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.

1977]

MOBILE HOMES ZONING

statutes designed for their benefit."9

1301

The persuasive record set forth

by the Weymouth court, supported by a learned social and economic
analysis, provides a rational basis for the fifty-two year threshold estab-

lished by the zoning ordinances; 70 accordingly, the court was correct in
determining that the use of age classifications in general, and the cut-

off age limit of fifty-two years in particular, do not violate the principles
of equal protection.

71

Notwithstanding the Weymouth court's detailed review of the

issues discussed above, the court's most sedulous scrutiny was reserved
for an issue that was not even raised by plaintiff-the exclusionary
effect of the ordinances.7 2

The New Jersey Supreme Court strongly

69. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 1701s(c)(B)
(1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14L-3a (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), all of which provide
housing programs or loans for the elderly, defined therein as being persons 62 years
or older.
70. 71 N.J. at 284-85, 364 A.2d at 1035. But cf. Campbell v. Barraud, 85 Misc.
2d 97, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (invalidating a provision establishing a retirement community for a New York municipality and limiting occupancy to individuals of
55 years or older). The court in Campbell found that limiting housing on the
basis of age, and particularly age 55, was unconstitutional, and conjured up "the
spectre of a completely stratified society . . . [in creating which] sociologists would do
well to study the rules and techniques of those other social creatures, the ants and the
bees." Id. at 104, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 387. This opinion, however, rests entirely on lower
court rulings in the Belle Terre, Woodland and Weymouth cases, all of which were subsequently reversed on appeal. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning
Bd., 135 N.J. Super. 97, 342 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 71 N.J. 230,
364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayer's Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376,
311 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
71. The New Jersey court also rejected a due process attack on the Weymouth ordinances, declaring that it constituted little more than a restatement of the equal protection challenge. 71 N.J. at 287-88, 364 A.2d at 1037. Under the doctrine set forth in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the guarantee of due process requires only
that a law not be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id.
at 525. The New Jersey court's careful study of the ordinance's relation to the general
welfare would seem to satisfy the latter requirement, and the court's well-reasoned rejection of the equal protection attack on the age classifications refutes any contention that
the 52 year cutoff provision is unreasonable or arbitrary.
For an analogous case also rejecting a due process attack on an ordinance granting
the elderly preferences with respect to housing, see Parrino v. Lindsay, 29 N.Y.2d 30,
35, 272 N.E.2d 67, 70, 323 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (1971). Parrino upheld a New York
City provision exempting the elderly from rent increases authorized under the city's rent
control provisions. Rejecting the contention that such an exemption amounted to deprivation of landlords' due process right to property (represented by the rent increases),
the court noted that if the original rent ceiling was valid (like the original ban on trailers
in Weymouth), a partial relaxation of its prohibitive effect, designed to benefit the elderly, did not further deprive the unexempted groups of any due process rights (whether
it be increased rent for landlords in Parrino, or access to mobile homes for the nonelderly in Weymouth). Id. at 34-35, 272 N.E.2d at 69, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 691-92.
72. 71 N.J. at 288-96, 364 A.2d at 1037-41.

1302

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

condemned exclusionary zoning practices in Mount Laurel, specifically
noting that land use regulations creating a retirement community for
the elderly were part of the exclusionary package of zoning ordinances
there.7 Although the Weymouth ordinances are not as restrictive as
those condemned in Mount Laurel,74 they do display a potentially exclusionary impact as pernicious as that discerned in the Mount Laurel
provisions. The New Jersey court engaged in an instructive review of
the factors that might have sufficed to establish the Weymouth ordinances as unlawfully exclusionary had this issue been properly brought
before it.
The court noted that housing for the elderly tends to provide net
tax benefits for municipalities, especially when income or age groups
with high demands for municipal services are thereby excluded.7
73. 67 N.J. at 169, 336 A.2d at 722. The Mount Laurel court further observed:
The extensive development requirements detailed in the ordinance make it apparent that the scheme was not designed for, and would be beyond the means
of, low and moderate income retirees. The highly restricted nature of the zone
is found in the requirement that [with limited exceptions] all permanent residents must be at least 52 years of age ....
Id. The court disapproved of such land use regulations because "[a]ll this affirmative
action for the benefit of certain segments of the population is in sharp contrast to the
lack of action, and indeed hostility, with respect to affording any opportunity for decent
housing for the township's own poor living in substandard accommodations . . . ." Id.
74. The Weymouth ordinances were drafted for the purpose of "providing . . .
dwellings which the elderly who need housing can afford" and thus seem designed to
accommodate those low-income elderly excluded by the Mount Laurel ordinances. Taxpayer's Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 381, 311 A.2d 187, 189-90
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). In addition, the Mount Laurel ordinances, unlike the
Weymouth provisions, placed an absolute limit on the number of children over 18'
who could reside with each "elderly" family in the retirement community established by
the ordinance. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 169, 336 A.2d 713, 722 (1975). Although the Weymouth provisions indirectly
limit the number of children by limiting the size of the mobile homes in which they
would dwell, the supreme court in Weymouth observed that this restriction alone does
not make the zoning ordinances exclusionary. 71 N.J. at 295 n.20, 364 A.2d at 1041
n.20. The New Jersey courts, however, had previously served notice that zoning ordinances restricting housing to adults and excluding children would be struck down.
Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971).
75. 71 N.J. at 289-92, 364 A.2d at 1038-39. Communities for the elderly provide
favorable tax consequences because their demand for municipal services-in particular
for schooling-is far less than that of the population as a whole. Because the elderly
rarely have many children of school age residing with them, a community in which
many of the residents are of advanced age does not need to expend a considerable
amount of its revenue on education. As a result, the entire community's tax burden can
be maintained at relatively low levels. Municipal tax benefits of this nature are the
usual impetus behind exclusionary zoning ordinances and constitute an important reason
for their invalidity. For example, the Mount Laurel court declared "[t]here cannot be
the slightest doubt that the reason for this course of conduct has been to keep down
local taxes on property . . . ." 67 N.J. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723; see, e.g., Hinman v.
Planning & Zoning Comm., 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1975). See also
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Such tax motivations were present in the Weymouth situation, and the
court observed that the prevalence of such improper zoning purposes
had motivated the New Jersey legislature to promulgate new zoning
laws ensuring that municipally-§ponsored housing projects for the
elderly would be part of a balanced housing stock meeting the housing
needs of all individuals 6 -essentially the mandate of the New Jersey
court in Mount Laurel.77 As a result of these judicial and legislative
declarations, the Weymouth court established the basic test for assaying
the exclusionary impact of such ordinances: "If it substantially contributes to an overall pattern of improper exclusion, the fact that the ordinance may also benefit the elderly is neither an excuse nor a justification to sustain a challenge to a zoning provision. 7 8s Since there was
no evidence presented on this point, the Weymouth ordinances were
not examined under this principle, but its significance as a limit on the
ramifications of the Weymouth result is. not to be underestimated.79 It
is apparent that, after Weymouth, ordinances restricting land use on the
basis of age will be permitted only to the extent that they conform to
a comprehensive plan that meets the regional housing needs of all
groups within the region.80
Because of plaintiffs' failure to challenge the ordinances as unlawfully exclusionary, the ultimate importance of this case may at first
appear to be limited. In one sense the entire result is moot, since the
Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971).
76. 71 NJ. at 288-92, 364 A.2d at 1037-39 (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
40:55D-62 to -68 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78)). In particular see N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:55D-65.g (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), declaring that the contents of a zoning ordinance must "[p]rovide for senior citizen community housing consistent with provisions
permitting other residential uses of a similar density in the same zoning district." See
also id. § 40:55D-21, which lists that requirement as one of the purposes of the state's
new Municipal Land Use Law.
77. 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
78. 71 N.J. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040 (footnote omitted).
79. As the court itself warns, "The Court's failure to probe more deeply into the
possible exclusionary effect of similar ordinances should not be understood to be the
product of blindness to their potentially exclusionary character, but only the consequence
of plaintiff's decision not to try the case on that legal theory' Id. at 295-96, 364 A.2d
at 1041.
80. See id. at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040. It should be noted that the Weymouth court
did recognize and approve the inclusionary effect of the ordinances, id., since the qualified use of mobile homes permitted by the regulation substantially reduces the exclusionary impact of one of the zoning devices, the prohibition of mobile homes, that the Mount
Laurel court found "inherently exclusionary." 67 N.J. at 197, 202, 336 A.2d at 737,
740 (Pashman, J., concurring). However, as the test for exclusionary effect enunciated
by the Weymouth court implies, the indirect inclusionary effect of ordinances such as
the Weymouth provisions will not otherwise prevent their invalidation should they indirectly operate to exclude other groups from a municipality.
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court declared that if the state's new zoning provisions were applicable
in Weymouth the challenged ordinances would not have been in compliance.8 ' Viewed from another perspective, the Weymouth case
seems to be merely a repetition of the decision in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., which also set

forth avenues of attack to be employed against allegedly exclusionary ordinances-but which nonetheless upheld the particular regulations there under challenge by requiring that discriminatory intent be
proved to show a violation of the equal protection clause. 2 The Weymouth decision, however, offers a far greater degree of guidance than

does Arlington Heights to future challengers of potentially exclusionary zoning, since the New Jersey court's elaboration of the characteris-

tics and purposes indicative of improper exclusionary ordinances offers a
clearer and more detailed benchmark by which such ordinances may
be successfully discerned and defeated.

In this respect the court's dis-

cussion of the Weymouth fact situation and its relationship to New Jersey's new land use law88 completes the New Jersey Supreme Court's

decision in Mount Laurel.84 In approving zoning ordinances restricting
land use on the basis of occupant age, the Weymouth court adds an
incisive ruling to those delivered by other jurisdictions affirming the
validity of such regulations. But by restricting the applicability of this
81. 71 N.J. at 296, 364 A.2d at 1041. The court declared that the new state provisions require "that where a zoning ordinance establishes a district in which senior citizen
communities are a permitted use, the ordinance must also allow housing of similar density for some other residential use in the same district." Id. The Weymouth zoning
ordinances make no such provision for other residential uses, and in fact density requirements for other types of housing in the municipality are considerably higher. Id. at 296,
364 A.2d at 1041-42; cf. NJ. STAT. ANN. 40:55D-2(l), -65(g) (West Cum. Supp. 197778) (encouraging senior citizen community housing, but requiring other residential uses
of a similar density in the same zoning district).
82. Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
.
espondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision. This
conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court of Appeals' further
ruling that the Village's decision carried a discriminatory "ultimate effect" is
without independent constitutional significance.
97 S. Ct. at 563, 566.
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-62 to -68 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
84. Although the Mount Laurel court had found that the provisions promoting a
retired adult community contributed to the exclusionary effect of the municipality's land
use regulations, the court specifically withheld passing "on the validity of any land use
regulation which restricts residence on the basis of occupant age." 67 N.J. at 169 n.7,
336 A.2d at 722 n.7.
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holding-by warning of the potentially exclusionary effect of such ordinances-the Weymouth holding is made consonant with the Mount

Laurel guidelines and supplements the principles set forth in that
decision.
Perhaps more importantly, the Weymouth opinion illustrates the
increasing impact of federal and state housing and land use policy on
the heretofore far-ranging power of local zoning authorities.8"

The

array of federal and state enactments cited by the New Jersey court
indicating governmental concern with the proper use of land on the one
hand, and the provision of proper accommodations for the elderly on
the other, illustrate the growing role legislative initative may come to
play in the struggle against exclusionary zoning and for adequate

housing.86 In particular, the Weymouth court's impressively substantiated argument that the elderly's use of mobile homes promotes the

general welfare provides a strong basis for contending that all groups,
regardless of age or income, should be permitted to reside in mobile

homes. Since the primary purpose of zoning ordinances is to create
a better environment for all elements of the community, those reasons
(e.g., cost and convenience) that justify mobile homes for the elderly
would seem to justify their use by those individuals who do not meet
the age specifications of the Weymouth ordinances.8 7 The Weymouth

court's argument, strongly emphasizing the contribution to the general
welfare provided by trailer housing, if pressed further, could be used to

dismantle remaining regulatory barriers to the socially beneficial use
of mobile homes.8 8 In this respect the Weymouth decision may become
85. See Reilly, New Directions in Federal Land Use Legislation, in LAND USE
PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE REFORM 331, 333-40 (D. Listokin ed.
1974).
86. The Mount Laurel court's observation that "[c]ourts do not build housing nor
do municipalities" reflects the limited role which the courts or local governments are
obliged to play in regard to these issues. 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. As another
observer has remarked with respect to states asserting state or regional control over land
use planning and regulation, "The message here to municipalities should be clear
enough. Either modify prevailing local zoning philosophy and practices or lose authority over local land use." Elias, Significant Developments and Trends in Zoning Litigation, in LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND F TR REFORM 157, 159 (D.
Listokin ed. 1974).
87. This in essence was one of the objections raised by the lower court to the Weymouth ordinances. Noting that the ordinances were adopted out of a concern with the
economic status of the elderly, the court declared: "But the same considerations which
allegedly motivated the adoption of the ordinances in this case are equally applicable
to young married couples or other individuals under the age of 52 years whose incomes
are low." 125 N.J. Super. at 382, 311 A.2d at 190.
88. See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322
(1971), invalidating local zoning ordinances that in effect excluded mobile homes
from the municipality. The court found that
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significant, not merely as a coda to Mount Laurel, but in prefiguring

the reversal of Vickers and thus ending the New Jersey Supreme
Court's "blanket tolerance of prohibitions upon mobile homes."' 9 If
New Jersey, one of the relatively few jurisdictions allowing such

bans,

0

should thus abandon its position, it is possible that other states

that also uphold local bans on mobile homes 1 may follow its lead.

Should this be the case, then Weymouth may soon come to be viewed
as a dramatic step forward in the wider battle against exclusionary
zoning.
IRA STEVEN LEFTON

[c]ertain uses of land have come to be recognized as bearing a real, substantial, and beneficial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare so as
to be afforded a preferred or favored status. To restrict such uses appears to
conflict with the concept of presumed validity of an ordinance prohibiting such
an otherwise legitimate use.
Id. at 210, 192 N.W.2d at 324. The court then observed that "[i]egislative enactments
geared toward a betterment of the general welfare will, in the appropriate factual setting,
give rise to a legally protected land use, thereby negating the operation of the presumption of validity which normally surrounds local legislative restrictions." Id. at 215, 192
N.W.2d at 326. Once such a protected land use has been defined, regulations restricting
its accessability bear a high risk of invalidation:
Since mobile home parks have, by virtue of state statute coupled with judicial precedent, been afforded a protected status, there is no longer a presumption of validity of an ordinance which operates toward their exclusion. Such
protection of this particular land use is of increased importance in view of the
massive nationwide housing shortage which necessitates a re-defining of the
term "general welfare" as applied to justify residential zoning.
Id. at 217, 192 N.W.2d at 328. A similar conflict between policies founded in statutes
that regulate and license certain land-use activities and those policies, also founded in
statutes, that encourage such uses as being in the public interest, is discussed in general
and with particular application to New Jersey in Feiler, Metropolitizatonand Land-Use
Parochialism-Towarda JudicialAttitude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655, 694-95 (1971).
89. 71 N.J. at 279 n.14, 364 A.2d at 1032 n.14. The court specifically avoids
reaching this issue in Weymouth-but in doing so lists those reasons upon which reversal
of Vickers could be based. Id.
90. The majority of states ruling on this issue have held such bans invalid. E.
BARTLEY & F. BArn, supra note 39, at 79; Moore, The Mobile Home and the Law, 6
AKRor L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
91. North Carolina is among those jurisdictions. See City of Raleigh v. Morand,
247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 343 (1958) (an ordinance prohibiting trailer camps from being established in residentially-zoned areas in the
city and within one mile of its corporate limits was a valid exercise of the police power).

